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Traditionally, information security has been approached in terms of how to achieve the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information. In this paper, we seek to ontologically examine information security by using 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s philosophical concepts of machine, coupling, interruption, and territory. 
Through these concepts, we conceptualize information security as an order-seeking, connection-based, 
territorial security machine that attempts to subject and harness other actors – from technical devices and 
physical barriers to employees and various combinations of these actors – to carry out the security machine’s 
protective tasks. The goal of the security machine is to block or interrupt the chaotic forces of the outside and, 
thus, to maintain the fragile order of information. However, the process of interrupting the outside requires 
interruption of the inside as well: users and organizations are interrupted daily by the security machine and its 
practices. Yet this aspect of information security has remained largely unexamined. We argue that the question 
of what information security does to its subjects – what its effects are – in the protected system should be 
examined more thoroughly. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we develop a philosophy of information security, a manner of approach that discusses 
the ontology of information security. More specifically, we delineate the ontology of information 
security to provide a point of view from which new research subjects can be suggested. Most of the 
existing research literature on information security is driven by practical aspirations. Scholars have 
focused on questions of improvement; for example, on how to develop information systems so that 
they are more secure, or on how to prevent the abuse of the systems (Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2001). In these undertakings, the concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA) have played a major role because scholars have viewed these as the chief objectives of 
information security (e.g., Dhillon, 2007; Stanton & Stam, 2006). Nonetheless, despite those studies 
that focus on CIA as the objective of information security and on how they are achieved in practice, 
information security in and of itself – the question of what it is ontologically – has remained largely 
unexamined (cf. Pieters, 2011). In this paper, we examine the ontology of information security to 
depict what information security is and what it does or, rather, to depict what it is through what it does. 
That is to say, we commence from the idea that information security is not a neutral entity; that is, it is 
not additional to or parallel with information systems but is in itself active and productive. 
 
Information security has become a part of everyday life. Organizations use significant quantities of 
resources to build up a sturdy information security system. Users in organizations and at home invest 
time in carrying out practices related to information security; for example, entering passwords and pin 
codes, updating software with the latest security patches, and dealing with suspected phishing 
emails. Moreover, as new technology is introduced, new security issues arise (e.g., viruses, mobile 
phone theft). Thus, information security is a transformative and pervasive entity. 
 
Due to the ways in which information security territorializes different spaces (from homes to large 
organizations), interrupts threats (e.g., to keep information available only to authorized users), and 
connects users (e.g., a user connecting to an email account through information security), we believe 
that utilizing Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the machine and territory in order to grasp some 
ontological features of information security is productive. The ontological approach – that is, the 
description of information security’s material and conceptual functions – questions whether 
information security is a mere protector of information. In other words, we argue that information 
security goes beyond its role of providing CIA because through its activity it increases the complexity 
of the system in which it is implemented. An ontological analysis reveals these additional roles. For 
example, information security can be problematic when it comes between a user and information, 
when it requires constant updating, or when those who use it require constant education. Moreover, 
by employing the concept of the machine and analyzing territorial, spatiotemporal features of 
information security, we develop new concepts and connections that reveal different aspects of 
information security and provide help with the future analysis of information security as a productive 
actor. This conceptualization provides a possibility for a new research problematization in which 
information security in itself is seen as a problematic actor as it comes between a user and a system. 
Through this problematization and through the future research that can be generated by it, we can 
improve our understanding of information security. 
 
In Section 2, we introduce the concept of the machine, and explore machines in information security 
and how everything that becomes connected to information security also becomes subjected to it. 
Moreover, we claim that individuals become modified by this subjection. In Section 3, we analyze the 
territorial nature of information security in spatial and temporal terms. Information security never 
exists in a void but always requires a material medium (data territory) and agents to achieve the order 
that it seeks. The agents, who organize safe zones in which data territories are situated, also exist in 
space and time. In Section 4, we also look at how another spatial category, the perimeters between 
the inside and the outside, connect or entangle with each other in information security. Finally, we 
discuss the implications of this; that is, potentially fertile research subjects based on our suggestions. 
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2. Some Features of the Machine 
The French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2004a) created the concept of a 
“machine”. For us, it provides a conceptual tool to approach security and information security in a 
novel manner; that is, to examine information security itself as a productive entity. Applying the 
machine concept to information security opens up a viewpoint that describes, in its own manner, the 
security landscape and helps us to understand security activity as a whole. Although we use the 
notion of the machine as a methodological tool, the security machine exists materially and has 
concrete ramifications. The first task is to outline what the machine is. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004a, pp. 2, 5–6, 38–39) claim that a machine has a function, which is to 
produce and interrupt (cf. Serres, 2007, p.11). They use the example of a mouth as a machine 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 39). It can produce, for example, a flow of chewed food for the 
stomach. In the same way, a door is a machine in terms of physical security (which is also part of 
information security (e.g., Basik, 2008, pp. 60–63; Rogers, 2006, pp.13–14)). It forms a barrier 
between inside and outside. In the network environment, a firewall carries out the same function in a 
technical manner. Bruno Latour (1992, pp. 154–155) has noted that a door carries out an enormous 
task because it produces a temporary hole in the wall; without the door, there would only be a wall, 
through which it is much more difficult to enter or exit. A firewall keeps certain connections out and 
allows particular traffic in. In the case of a door, the stream of individuals arriving and departing flows 
through the temporary hole – the door. It is a machine that allows the free flow, a flow that can also 
be interrupted by the same machine when the door closes. In a similar manner, the flow of data 
packets is interrupted by the firewall. As demonstrated here, a machine can be anything that merely 
interrupts the flow of something – chewed food, a crowd, or information. 
 
These Deleuze-Guattarian machines do not stand isolated but become connected to form huge 
assemblages1
 
. Deleuze and Guattari (2004a, p. 5) actually state that a machine is always coupled to 
another machine. To continue the mouth example, it can be argued that the mouth is connected to 
the stomach (which is another machine as such); without the mouth machine, the stomach machine 
would have nothing to process (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 39). Referring again to information 
security, a door or a firewall is not an isolated machine carrying out its job. A corridor connected to 
the door or routers connected to the firewall are other machines that create lines of movement, 
allowing a spatially confined stream of people or data packets to be transferred. The limited space 
between the walls prevents (interrupts) the chaotic dispersion of the stream. The task carried out by a 
corridor becomes evident if we consider a concourse: a large hall allows a crowd to spread out. 
In addition to a corridor machine (spreading interrupter, straight-line-producer), a door may be 
connected to other types of machines. In fact, the door (like any machine) can have multiple 
connection points; it may be connected to an electronic lock and logger that in turn forms a 
connection to an information system running in a server. The server might host several different 
services, such as an access control system, but it might also carry out other services as well. So a 
door is connected, in a direct way, to a network of other machines that form part of a security 
machine at a single level in space. A door with a lock denies and allows entrance, divides and creates 
territories (with the help of walls, fences, surveillance and other agents), while at the same time 
provides information about those who pass via loggers (connected to information systems). Thus, a 
door as such is connected to other machines, the types of which depend on what it produces. 
Through the connections (or couplings) of machines emerge new machines: the assemblage of the 
door with the electronic lock and logger can be seen as a new machine unit. 
 
                                                     
1 In this sense, machine thinking resembles actor network theory (cf. Latour, 1996; 2005). 
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Figure 1. An Example of a Machine and its Connections 
 
Figure 1 summarizes and simplifies the basic thought behind our concept of machine. First, there is 
the “Flow 1” of individuals coming in. “Machine D”, which is the assemblage of separate units (door, 
electronic lock and policy regulating the use of all of these), interrupts “Flow 1” and produces “Flow 
2”. Machine D interrupts everyone including individuals with keys. By using the valid key they can 
proceed, while the keyless remain outside.  
 
The couplings are connections of linked machines. Flow 1 is not coupled to Machine D but merely 
becomes connected to it through the interruption process of Machine D. If we use the term coupling in 
such a case, we refer to a connection between machines. A coupling is a connection, but not all 
connections are necessarily couplings because individuals or machines may become temporarily 
connected with other machines without being coupled. An example of this would be an individual 
walking through a door/lock machine: They are temporarily connected (processed by) the door/lock 
machine, but not coupled with it. 
2.1. Connections: Emergence of Novelty and Subjection 
On the one hand, one of the goals of thinking through the machine concept is the attempt to reveal 
what takes place in information security activity, which enables us to evaluate security processes both 
in their individual forms and as a whole in a combination of elements. This description of information 
security, on the other hand, will eventually lead us to a position from which we can problematize 
information security in a new manner. In Figure 1, Machine D is a new machine, a coupling of 
Machine unit A, Machine unit B, and Machine unit C. Machine unit C differs from Machine unit A and 
Machine unit B because information security policies are non-material. Thus, Machine unit C is not an 
exclusive property of Machine D but can be implemented in other door/lock machines as well. But 
Machine unit A and Machine unit B are material machines and cannot be implemented in other 
parallel machines simultaneously. In other words, the same door cannot exist in two places at the 
same time. It is, however, a part of Machine D. But if we move to a larger scale we could see 
Machine D, and thus Machine unit A and Machine unit B, as part of a building machine. This is to say 
that as machines are coupled they form assemblages and new machines: the door machine as a 
temporary hole, a door/lock machine as a key-controlled temporary hole, a door/lock/policy coupling 
as a regulated passage-control machine. 
 
The fact that machines couple in line with other machines and that machines couple to create new 
machines implies that we could examine machines by dissecting them and finding new machines. 
An electronic lock is a machine, yet it is an assemblage of other machines. Transistors, electronic 
circuits, and a case in which these are embedded are all machines. The firewall is not a single 
machine but comprises different components. One machine is never just one machine but always 
multiple machines, which means that it is filled with inner connections or connected to other 
Machineunit
‘A’:
e.g. door
Flow 1:
Individuals
(outside)
Machineunit
’B’:
e.g. electronic lock
Flow 2:
Individualswith valid keys
(inside)
Machineunit
‘C’:
Machine‘D’:
Coupled
‘A’&‘B’&‘C’&‘D’  
,
‘ ’
, electronic lock
e.g., security policy
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machines (see Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 45–46; cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 38; Latour, 
1999, p. 182) 2
 
. Thinking in terms of machines opens quite a chaotic view: connection upon 
connection, almost an infinite number of machines connected to one another. This raises the 
question of limits. Limits are formed in terms of the direction, density, and intensity of connections. 
For example, a virus scanner couples to the operating system and computer it runs on. Yet, it is 
separated. In the file system, it has its own files and directories or folders. The processes of the 
program refer mostly to its own processes: where to jump to, what to load, what routine to run. In 
this sense, the program is turned more in on itself than outwards and, thus, it forms an intensive 
whole, an entity, a dense network of connections encompassing a continuously interacting inside 
(cf. Pyyhtinen, 2010, pp. 43–44). This is to say that the set of small machines – pieces of executed 
program code – form an assemblage that appears as a one, as a whole, as a unit. Units can be 
considered as extractables (Delanda, 2009, pp. 10–11). A virus scanner, or a door, can be 
replaced with another unit. We could also change the electronic lock embedded in the door, or we 
could replace an electronic circuit or a transistor in the electronic lock. In summary, machines can 
be units in themselves and they are never isolated, but connected. 
Novelty in Machine D springs from connections. Machine unit A, Machine unit B, and Machine unit C 
do not work separately in Machine D but are brought together in Machine D through the couplings. 
Placing two elements in a position of working together differs from a situation in which they are 
individual, unconnected elements. When they are connected, both components add something to the 
assemblage and to each other (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, 2004b; Latour, 1999, pp. 179, 182–
183; May, 2006, pp. 123–124, 137–139). Bennett (2010, p. 22) puts it aptly: to enter an assemblage 
is to simultaneously modify it and to become modified by it. The door is not the same without the lock 
and vice versa. Novelty emerges in couplings. Furthermore, this emergence is actualized in every 
event of connection and disconnection of machines, and this serves as a foundation for machine 
dynamics: as a machine is coupled it becomes different. 
 
In addition to the novelty that emerges with any connection, the connections have another feature: 
subjection. Subjection is a line of relation and effect that exists in any connection3
 
. In other words, 
both ends of the connection provide an environment for each other. The door is subjected to the lock 
as it forces the door to stay closed, but at the same time the lock is embedded and thus subjected to 
its environment, which is the door. If the door is wide open, the lock cannot function: the door has to 
be in the correct position to be locked. Subjection does not stop here because there are more 
connections. The example of a virus scanner and a computer may further assist readers to grasp the 
idea of subjection. The scanner produces an immunology system (by interrupting viruses) for the 
computer (see Parikka, 2007), while the computer serves as an environment for the scanner to be 
deployed in, to work with. As the scanner is installed on a computer, alongside the emergence of 
novelty – that is, the computer is not the same without the virus scanner – the line of subjection 
surfaces. The computer is subjected to the virus scanner since the scanner has access to the files on 
the computer. It may interrupt the action of the computer in the event that it detects malware. 
However, the virus scanner is subjected to the computer and the files on it. It has to scan the files that 
are transferred to the computer (see Figure 2). It is as if there was a rope tying both sides: if one 
moves, so does the other. The connection between the two is a positive power relation – both affect 
each other’s activity (see Foucault, 1998, pp. 138–139). Thus, connection, emergence of novelty, and 
subjection go hand-in-hand. 
                                                     
2 Bruno Latour (1999, p. 183) would call the process of treating an assemblage as one, with a clear input and output, blackboxing. 
As with everything in Latour’s approach, black boxes are actants, which are defined by their effect on other actants. 
3 Our concept of subjection springs from Michel Foucault’s (1991; 1998, pp. 92–96; 2002, pp. 337–342) idea of power that is a 
specific type of relation. 
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Figure 2. Connection and Subjection of Virus Scanner and a File with a Virus 
2.2. The Emerging Connections 
The security machine is not isolated but is connected to other machine assemblages, such as 
science. If we look at the applications of security and its modes of thinking we notice that they stem 
from science, although not exclusively. There are new thoughts – at least modifications of thoughts if 
not novel ideas – that creep into the picture and alter the applications. Knowledge of biometrics and 
behaviometrics (see Nisenson, Yariv, El-Yaniv, & Meir, 2003; Statham, 2006) – which here represent 
science – can alter locks. The lock in the door could be replaced with a biometric or behaviometric 
lock, or these could be added as features to the lock to increase its defense. Again, because there is 
a connection, there is subjection as well. The lock is subjected to the knowledge and application of 
the lock. On the other hand, as the lock is actually implemented, it could itself be studied by 
researchers who will then add to the field of knowledge of, for example, biometrics or behaviometrics. 
This is to say that the security machine is subjected to concrete machines in it – for example, doors, 
walls, locks, virus scanners, firewalls, encryption programs – and more abstract machines such as 
science and concepts of value; that is, what is considered valuable enough to requires protection. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the security machine is subjected to all of its connections. In 
addition, if we recall the concept of the emergence of novelty in the case of connections, we can note 
that the security machine is in a constant state of change – a state of “becoming”, in Deleuzian 
terminology – since, firstly, the connections are emerging all the time and, secondly, the machines at 
the other end of the connections are changing. Deleuze prefers to use the word becoming instead of 
being since nothing ever stays the same but is in a constant state of change (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004a; 2004b; Stagoll, 2005; May, 2006, p. 59). 
 
In order to produce some analytical order and to aid conceptualization, the security machine can be 
seen as functioning at various levels: the physical, the technical, and the social. Throughout our 
paper, the levels should not be understood to be strictly separate because they are not isolated from 
each other. For example, technical equipment is physical as well as part of the social world. 
 
Keeping the above in mind, we could take another look at Figure 1. Along with the door (Machine unit 
A) shown in Figure 1, the concrete walls, corridors, and fences reside on the physical level, and the 
technical equipment (Machine unit B, an electronic lock in Figure 1), such as firewalls, intrusion 
detection scanners, and security cameras, constitutes the technical level. The social level includes 
different discursive elements such as policies (Machine unit C in Figure 1), compliance deals, and 
general regulations for behavior (actions aiming to control behavior, such as information security 
training). Figure 1 shows Machine D, which combines all the levels. At this point, we understand a 
machine as a producer/interrupter or, to be more precise, a machine that produces through 
File: Code of an executable 
program including viral code
Virus scanner
File is analyzed by the scanner thus it is subjected to analysis
When a file appears (is downloaded from a network) to the computer and 
thus to the scanner, the scanner is forced to analyze the file, therefore the 
scanner is subjected to the file 
Line of subjection
Line of subjection
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interruption and has connections. The security machine appears on the concrete and discursive 
(social) levels. It is a meshwork of machines – an assemblage. 
3. Territory 
Information – defined as data – always lies in the physical space and carries a precise order that may 
be formulated as a series of numbers or letters, or that may be a picture, a blueprint, and so on. 
Because information necessitates a piece of the physical space, there is a territorial aspect 
embedded in the notion of information. For instance, a file on a disk requires a particular physical 
space for “magnetic imprinting”, and written information demands a surface – a space – on which to 
be written. Spaces are hence invaded – territorialized – by the material expressions of information; for 
example, signs, digits, or diagrams. There is always a medium, an occupied material space, without 
which information cannot exist. 
 
This leads to a situation where no actual information lies beyond the material world. When we turn 
our attention to the actual, we have to take note of its counterpart, the virtual. There is virtual 
information that can be retrieved from a data storage device to actualize it in new processes. Actual 
information is something that is here and present, while the virtual includes information that can be 
brought into the domain of the actual. A distant memory is virtual if it is not thought of but becomes 
actual as it is recalled. When the memory is recalled it changes because it is altered by the 
constellation of other information and experiences to which it becomes connected in the process of 
recall (cf. Deleuze, 1988; see also May, 2006, pp. 45–52). This means that we can have information 
that is not actual information but which has the possibility for it to enter the material world. Alongside 
the aspects of virtuality and actuality, time begins to play a role: information in the form of spoken 
words withers away as the sonic waves – the materiality of the spoken words – fade. There is always 
a time for information to be “pronounced”, a moment of appearance, and this is eventually followed by 
a moment of withering (see May, 2006, pp. 45–52; cf. Foucault, 2003, pp. 114–116). Any medium is 
written at some time, and wears out over time. 
 
For now we have two aspects to the appearance of information: the spatial and the temporal. There is 
still one aspect to consider: the order of the information (i.e., what it is that is written). With the order 
of the information, we refer to the way in which the information is organized. For instance, consider 
this text. If the letters were mixed up randomly, the text would not carry its original information. 
Information security is not, therefore, just about space and time, but about organization and the order 
of that particular space.  
3.1. The Chaotic Outside 
Territory plays a dual role in our view of information security. Every piece of information reserves a 
territory (space on a disk or on a piece of paper for instance); however, on the other hand, there are 
also territories – safe zones – that are established to protect information. For example, a locked door 
or a password-protected account represents a safe zone territory that surrounds the data territory. In 
other words, the security machine has to establish or deploy its activity in the space that it is designed 
to shield. It is the order of information and the space that the information occupies that are protected. 
These safe zones are, nevertheless, surrounded by uncertainty – the forces of chaos outside (cf. 
Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 333; Grosz, 2008, pp. 10–11, 47). Michel Serres (2007, p. 126) calls 
this type of chaos “noise”. The phrase “forces of chaos” mostly refers to the banal movement of 
different particles. This chaotic movement is the beginning of everything, which includes order and 
organization (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 345). Grosz writes, in a Deleuzian manner, about how 
chaos gives birth to the fragile order that is life, a term that could easily be replaced with “a piece of 
information”, which holds an order as well: 
 
“In the beginning” is chaos, the whirling, unpredictable movement of forces, vibratory 
oscillations that constitute the universe. Chaos here may be understood not as absolute 
disorder but rather as a plethora of orders, forms, wills – forces that cannot be 
distinguished or differentiated from each other, both matter and its conditions for being 
otherwise, both the actual and the virtual indistinguishably. Somewhere in this chaotic 
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universe, in a relatively rare occurrence, through chance, molecular randomness 
generates organic proteins, cells, proto-life. Such life can only exist and perpetuate itself 
to the extent that it can extract from the whirling and experientially overwhelming chaos 
that is nature, materiality, and their immanent forces those elements, substances, or 
processes it requires, can somehow bracket out or cast into shadow the profusion of 
forces that engulf and surround it so that it may incorporate what it needs. […] [T]here is 
something fundamentally unstable about both its milieu and organic constitution (Grosz, 
2008, pp. 5–6). 
 
Therefore, in terms of information security, the order born from chaos – the piece of information – is in 
a fragile state; that is, in danger of slipping back into chaos. The chaotic forces of outside threaten to 
penetrate inside (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 345). An example should make the discussion more 
concrete. A hard disk, assembled in a production line, constructed from pieces of material, and 
configured precisely, constitutes a functioning storage medium. Solid stability of performance is 
sought, but unfortunate breakdowns and accidents do occur; for example, laptops are sometimes 
dropped. The physical failure of a hard disk caused by an outside force poses a threat in terms of 
information security because it scrambles the order on the disk and, in the worst case, makes the 
data irretrievable. The organization of information is lost. Again, the world outside and its altering 
forces constitute the threat. However, there are safety measures such as free-fall detection systems 
inside laptops or self-monitoring, analysis, and reporting technologies (SMART) applied to new hard 
drives that are engaged against the forces of failure. For instance, the free-fall detection system is 
designed to avoid or reduce damage when the laptop is no longer in control but thrown into free fall. It 
is literally a struggle between the forces that aim to maintain the fragile order and any uncontrolled 
movement that may possibly overthrow that order. If a failure occurs, and the disk loses the battle 
against chaos, there are still plenty of measures that seek to restore the lost order. Data recovery 
programs and the restoration of backups seek to do the job of re-establishing that order. The battle is 
lost, but the aim is now to attempt to move back to a time before the failure. 
 
So we have the forces of chaos whirling outside, which threaten to erode and destroy the order 
inside. In order to establish an inside against the hostile outside, a border, such as a wall, has to be 
created and, thus, a territory, a safe zone, born (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, pp. 343–347). This 
line or frame creates a territory out of chaos (Grosz, 2008, p.11). Importantly, however, the inside 
cannot be created anywhere other than in the middle of the outside, and that, to establish it, elements 
and components of the outside have to be used. 
3.2. The Wall 
There is no territory without a frame (Grosz, 2008, pp. 11, 13). However, it requires quite an effort to 
divide, limit, and confine space and maintain the order of the inside. The security machine is, thus, a 
wall-erecting machine. It creates physical walls, fences, and doors that all reside on the physical level 
and are quite easy to understand as borders. In many cases, borders are announced with “placards” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, pp. 348–350). In the case of companies, a logo or name on the building 
announces a border, the beginning of the territory. In terms of information security, standards such as 
ISO/IEC 27002 describe the function of physical security as setting barriers in order to hinder 
outsiders from getting in (Basik, 2008, pp. 60–63; ISO/IEC 27002, 2005; Rogers, 2006, pp. 13–14). In 
practice, then, physical security is understood quite literally as a method of setting obstacles or 
barriers – erecting walls and fences – to create security perimeters in order to establish safe zones. 
This is the frame of territory without which there would be only chaos (Grosz, 2008, pp. 11, 13). This 
division establishes a categorical difference between us and them, insiders and outsiders. Moreover, 
borders do not emerge merely on the physical level. Technical walls are also erected: a firewall is the 
most obvious of these kinds of walls. A firewall follows the most basic digital pattern: allow or deny, 
true or false, one or zero. A firewall either accepts or rejects the attempt at connection. The previously 
mentioned passage-control systems constitute a part of the technical level in which an electronic lock 
is a technical placard that announces the borderline between inside and outside. A pop-up window 
that requests a username and password is another border placard. 
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In addition to the physical and technical level, the social level includes walls, too. Compliance to 
standards, information security policies, and code of conducts about how to handle information erect 
walls that seek to keep information inside. When individuals leave the territory for good (for example, 
employees quit their jobs), they become outsiders, which comes with consequences: their passwords 
and user accounts are terminated, and keys – perhaps uniforms and name tags as well – are taken 
away. The border cannot be ignored. It concretely determines who the agent is: an insider or an 
outsider. As long as the information exists, the ex-employee, now an outsider, is still in the reach of 
the security machine. For example, the employee might have agreed to a non-disclosure agreement 
in which they promise that they will not reveal the information in their brain to other outsiders. At this 
point, we have to remember the dual role of territory: there are the valuable assets that carry inner 
order – data territory (e.g., a file on a disk) – and then there is the other territory – the safe zone – that 
contains the maintained order (e.g., an office with locked doors, a firewall on its server, or compliance 
deals with employees). However, the difference between the two is more a theoretical or hierarchical 
one: the one is set to serve the other. The safe zone territory is established and walled in to protect 
the other territory that is constituted by the order of information. To put it slightly differently, the 
security machine seeks to keep the order of the secured object by establishing an ordered and 
controlled zone around it (see Figure 3). Ontologically, both territories are keeping chaos out. 
However, in Figure 3, we see that the safe zone still appears as the forces of chaos to the data 
territory. Anyone in the order of the safe zone – in reach of data territory – could destroy the order of 
the data territory. The territories are simultaneously subjected to each other: the territory, like any 
entity, possesses a subjective force. 
 
 
Figure 3. One Territory Inside Another 
3.3. The Rhythms of the Inside 
But what are the orders in the two territories? Again, it is a relational matter: if a secret is kept in a 
cellar (safe zone), then the order of the safe zone is constituted in the positions of the door and the 
lock. However, if we approach the issue of information security, it seems as though the order is based 
on CIA, which can be implemented through the use of identification, authentication, and authorization 
(IAA) (Dhillon, 2007). Nonetheless, we cannot emphasize enough that the machine possesses a 
virtual side as well: it is open to change. CIA/IAA is merely one way to carry out the task. Keeping 
 
DATA TERRITORY 
That is, a material medium comprising 
information that always possesses a 
particular order. 
(e.g., order: binary series 01101; 
material space: hard disk.) 
Borders 
of territories  
and  
chaos 
SAFE ZONE 
Territory established to protect data territories. 
Agents at the physical (e.g., walls), technical (e.g., virus 
scanner), and social (e.g., employee) levels have to be 
organized in such a manner that they protect or at least 
do not compromise data territories within the safe zone. 
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something safe in a hidden cellar is another way. Since CIA/IAA is a common feature of security 
machines, we have to consider what CIA/IAA means in terms of territory. 
 
Let us first unpack CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability). On a practical level, “confidentiality” 
pertains to secrecy, which means that only selected agents can reach the information. This indicates 
that the physical space reserved by the information is confined or walled in. For instance, access to a 
file on a disk may be restricted through technical solutions. “Integrity” refers to the stability of the 
organization of data in that particular space. In our example, the file on the disk maintains its integrity 
if it does not get corrupted (integrity can be ensured through the use of checksums and backups). 
 
“Availability” relates to accessibility: if the file is to be read, it has to be available. CIA can therefore be 
understood to concern the data territory. It relates directly to information, the space information 
occupies, time (when the information appears and how its material expression fades away), and the 
organization of that data. IAA (identification, authentication, authorization) provides a solution for what 
should be carried out to attain CIA. Nevertheless, we do not propose that the aim of CIA is reached if 
IAA is carried out. IAA is simply a proposal that many security machines have captured and 
connected to themselves. Furthermore, many measures have been developed that seek to achieve 
IAA. IAA does not relate to information as such, but it pertains to the safe zone territory that 
surrounds the shielded object. To seek IAA – to use practices that try to fulfill IAA – is a rhythm of 
safe zones. Deleuze and Guattari (2004b, p. 345) claim that a rhythm is an answer to chaos. Insiders 
at every level are made to function to this rhythm4
 
. To become an insider is to begin to resonate with 
this rhythm. However, the complexity of the situation is apparent because IAA is just one rhythm of 
the inside. Compliance deals are not IAA, but involve control of the inside, which keeps information 
inside through social regulations. IAA is an important technical rhythm that leads to the idea of user 
accounts, which makes divisions in the territory. IAA organizes the inside. For instance, every user 
account has its own space that includes information that a user can access. This is basically territorial 
space management through the concept of user accounts. Borders are established against the 
outside world, but also against other users. Furthermore, users are not equal but are usually divided 
into hierarchical categories with different privileges.  
Thus, territories deal with insides and outsides, and can be placed inside each other to give territories 
in territories. Furthermore, the situation is dynamic because territories constantly move in relation to 
each other. Attempts are made to keep the inside in controlled order, but there is constant movement 
in territories. A file can be copied, modified, and transferred. Still, there is a desire for hygiene – 
keeping the chaos out – on different levels: a virus scanner is responsible for keeping its territory 
clean (see Parikka, 2007), a door code seeks to keep outsiders outside, an information security policy 
tries to enforce the use of IAA when, for example, an unknown person requests confidential 
information, and so on. Because outside elements threaten the territory, the territory is placed under 
constant maintenance. For instance, walls and fences are fixed if they get broken down, and firewalls 
are updated, as are virus databases. Again, it is a question of the order of the inside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4  We find the term “rhythm” useful and descriptive. A rhythm is based on pulses, repetition, time, and timing. Take a moment to 
contemplate the following: how many repetitive tasks are there in the realm of information security, from the cycles of security 
update releases to the steady blinking lights of a firewall, from education sessions to awareness campaigns? How many times do 
you log in daily? Is there a cycle of maintenance of systems? Rhythms differ from one zone to another; still, the term captures a 
fair amount of the world. Moreover, as Deleuze and Guattari (2004b, p. 345) claim, this rhythm is an attempt to seal off the chaos 
outside. Here, the security machine expresses its productive side: look how much time we spend on information security. 
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Table 1. Information Considered as a Data Territory and Machine-Established Safe Zone 
Data territory Spatial Order Temporal 
Appearance of 
a piece of 
information 
Requires space in order to 
“appear” 
Always carries a precise 
organization of order 
There is always the 
moment of emergence 
Example  A file on a disk 10010010 The moment when the file is created 
Some possible 
forces of chaos 
(i.e., threats)  
Unstable medium, cracker, 
natural disaster, a virus, etc 
A virus scrambles the order to 
10001000 
Time wears out the 
physical medium 
Example 
A laptop is dropped accidently 
and the mass storage becomes 
damaged 
The original order and thus the 
file becomes irretrievable 
Information disappears at 
that moment 
Rhythm of 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability 
(C) Only predefined users are 
granted access to the location 
or through networks 
(I) The integrity is guaranteed, 
order remains the same or altered 
as desired 
(A) Availability is ensured 
when the file is needed 
Example Administrator files cannot be accessed by a regular user Checksums are calculated  
At time 1 the file is 
available on medium 1, 
At time 2 - when medium 
1 is out of order – the file 
is available on medium 2 
Safe zone 
Appearance of 
a safe zone 
territory 
Different types (technical, 
physical and social) of walls are 
erected in order to confine 
territory from the outside 
Control of the zone is sought by 
organizing the order within  
There is always the 
moment of emergence 
Example  
A firewall is installed, a 
compliance deal is drawn up, or 
concrete walls are erected 
The firewall accepts only certain 
connections, the compliance deal 
seeks to organize and control the 
behavior of users, and concrete 
walls prevent outsiders from 
entering premises freely 
The moment when the 
measures are put into 
effect and the duration of 
the measures 
Forces of chaos 
(i.e., threats)  
Something penetrates the 
physical space or the network of 
a safe zone 
The control and the order of the 
inside is lost, if the inside is 
intruded upon 
The force of becoming 
obsolete 
Example 
A virus, a cracker or a social 
engineer infiltrates the physical 
space or the network 
Users do not comply but take 
mass storage devices out of the 
perimeter breaking the 
regulations intentionally on non-
intentionally 
A software run on a 
server becomes 
vulnerable to new viruses 
One of the 
rhythms: 
identification, 
authentication, 
authorization 
A user is identified (I) and 
authenticated as an insider by 
what they know (password), or 
how they appear (biometrics) or 
behave (behaviometrics). Users 
are authorized to access only 
certain spaces (physical spaces 
or files) 
Everyone within the safe zone is 
under control as they have 
become insiders by going through 
IAA and complying with 
agreements 
The status of being an 
insider as well as 
compliance deals both 
have duration 
Example 
A user enters a password, a 
fingerprint is scanned, or 
behavior is analyzed to allow 
access 
Mass storage devices are treated 
as they should be according to 
inside regulations 
An ex-employee is no 
longer an insider. A new 
employee is introduced 
to regulations 
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The categories in Table 1 should not be read as distinct because the dimensions of space, time, and 
order are tangled around each other. For example, if information disappears, this disappearance 
takes place in all the dimensions, and confidentiality relates to not only spatial but also temporal 
aspects as well. Furthermore, the table is illustrative – it is not a complete list. 
4. The Volatile Agents – the Imported Chaos 
4.1. Human Agents 
The force of subjection is everywhere (see Section 3). In territories, all the agents throughout the levels 
are subjected to the order of the territory. On the other hand, the territory is subjected to these agents 
and their movements. For example, users go through IAA (in order to be able to log on to a system), but 
technical equipment is also configured – that is, subjected – to fit the system. As seen in the previous 
sections, the processes of taking in – the rituals of becoming an insider–are carried out on multiple 
levels. In other words, agents are shaped to belong to the territory: they are made insiders. 
 
Nonetheless, the agents – even as insiders made compliant to the rhythms and practices of the 
inside – may pose a threat to the protected system. Throughout information security literature, the 
human element5
 
, as the users of information systems are labeled, has been postulated as one of 
the most challenging factors of information security (see Long, Wiles, & Mitnick, 2008; Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002; Schneier, 2004; Stanton & Stam, 2006; Winkler, 2005). Most security breaches occur 
due to the human element (Deloitte, 2007; Schifreen, 2006), whether intentionally or by mistake. 
For example, users may use weak passwords or not change them frequently enough – or users 
simply choose to ignore information security policies. Continuing the password example, the 
problem is dealt with quite easily using technical-level solutions: a system might automatically 
require frequent changes of passwords while simultaneously measuring the strength of the 
passwords suggested. Or to make it even more secure, the system could be altered to use 
biometric or behaviometric authentication measures in addition to the use of passwords (see 
Nisenson et al., 2003). Thus, the password would not play such a significant role because, if this 
method fails, another mechanism of IAA emerges. What the technical suggestions actually seek to 
achieve is (partial) removal of human agency. Humans are not programmable and, therefore, not 
easy to predict in comparison with rational machines. 
The security machine functions at the level of ethics by seeking to create good users, good insiders, 
and good behavior in terms of information security6
 
. The use of positive power (see Foucault, 1998, 
pp. 138–139) and creation of good users is required because rational and technical solutions cannot 
take over the entire field of human behavior. It should also be noted that the security machine is 
limited in space. This implies that the users in one security machine can be also users of another 
system, which may compromise the first system through incorrect behavior. For example, the security 
machine tells us – if it is effective in any way – that an employee should not use their passwords in 
any other system because, if the other system is malicious or leaks passwords, then every other 
system with the same password and the same user name will be compromised. 
However, the creation of good users is far from being an easy task. What is uncontrollable with the 
human is the relation to the self. As Foucault (1992, p. 26) puts it, in the case of ethics, the individual 
has a relation to the self through an ethical code: the self is subjected by the individual to the code 
(see also Vuorinen, 2007). The code does not transfer directly but includes ways of carrying out the 
code (Foucault, 1992, pp. 26–27). For example, the rules implemented by the security machine 
usually seek to interrupt the flow of information to the outside, which prohibits the removal of flash 
drives to outside the perimeter. In subjection to the rules, human behavior is under double subjection: 
                                                     
5  When we speak about the “human element” (and, in the next section, about technical agents) we note the same reservations as 
with the “levels”. There is no pure human element; it is connected to the world of objects (Latour, 1993; 1999; 2005; Orlikowski & 
Scott, 2008). It could be even asked how the claim can be made that the human element is the problem in the world of 
information security, as this is an assemblage of humans and a system. 
6  Being a good user is to be aware of the security threats, which is to keep the system updated. Security awareness campaigns are 
an attempt to constantly remind the user of what good behavior – and thus being a good user – means (see Layton, 2005). 
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it is subjected to the rule and to the relation to the self. The question asking “what shall I do in order to 
comply with the rule” is the relation to the self that affects the behavior. In the end, will the employee 
go through their pockets thoroughly to discover possibly misplaced USB mass drives before leaving 
the office, or will they merely write the rule written on a post-it note? Or is the rule only stated in the 
written format of the information security policy book where it does not affect the actual behavior of 
individuals in any way? 
 
The relation to the self complicates education, makes complying with information security policies more 
difficult, obscures the implementation of information security standards and frameworks – such as ISO 
27002 (2005) and COBIT 4.1 (2007), and actually eludes them because the relation to the self lies 
almost beyond capture from the outside. From the viewpoint of information security, the double 
connection is an outside element that is imported to the organized territory. It is chaotic, unpredictable; it 
is noise (see Serres, 2007, p. 126) – an example of the forces of chaos that stem from the outside. In 
addition to this double subjection, the users import chaos to the inside in the form of thoughts that relate 
to the outside. From thinking of anything that is not work related to idling on social media sites (such as 
Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter), this is a manifestation of the outside, the chaos. 
4.2. Technical Agents and the Whirling Outside 
Chaos at the human level is evident and chaos “contaminates” technical systems through users. 
However, technical equipment, even though it is used as an order-bringing element, carries with it its 
own unpredictability. The technical level harnessed to the security machine is neither pure nor without 
flaws. Despite quality checks, integrity checks, and self-diagnostics – which are themselves security 
machines – faulty products are connected to the security machine. Technical-level products wear out, 
include bugs, and may be exposed to malware. Even without any errors, the technical level is brought 
from the outside and, because it is connected to the inside, might not be compatible with the internal 
order. This is the reason it might be better not to install updates immediately after release (Beattie, 
Arnold, Cowan, Wagle, & Wright, 2002). 
 
What is important to note here is the fact that everything within the territory is brought from the 
outside, which the territory is also fighting. In other words, there are no “inside elements” as such; 
they all originate from the outside and, through rituals, such as IAA, elements become insiders. As 
discussed in Section 3, the inside has to be established in the middle of the outside, and now we see 
that all the elements – the machines which are finally inside – are brought in from the chaos. 
Everything from operating systems to virus scanners, firewalls, security standards, frameworks (e.g., 
ISO 27002, 2005; COBIT 4.1, 2007), and updates are imported from the outside. 
 
In summary, the territory is a region in which the order is arranged by the security machine. However, 
it is not a total blockage – an isolated isle in the sea of threats. Information has to be available when 
needed and, thus, the machine is filled with movement: movement that is allowed to enter the 
territory. Data packets rushing into the network represent this kind of movement. The particles that 
are moving – whether human, technical, or physical – originate from the outside. It is like folding a 
page in a book: an inside is created in the fold – the pleat – but this stems from the book, the 
environment (cf. Deleuze, 2006; Grosz, 2001, p. 68; Serres & Latour, 1995, pp. 59–62). Through the 
machine and territory metaphors, we can realize that information security is a machine-filtered and 
machine-ordered territory, which is “folded” from its environment as an intensive mesh of 
connections. In Table 2, we present some of the outside effects that take place in the territory. Again, 
this is not intended as a complete list; the table is only intended to be illustrative. 
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Table 2. The Imported Chaotic Outside 
 ‘Natural’ flaws 
(before 
implementation) 
Measures of 
prevention 
Flaws generated 
within after 
implementation 
Counter 
measures 
Problems in 
connection Counter measures 
Technical 
level 
Faulty circuits, bugs 
in program 
Quality 
checks, alpha 
and beta 
testing  
Product wears 
out, 
becomes 
vulnerable to new 
malware  
Replacement, 
updating 
software 
Product turns 
out to be 
incompatible 
with the new 
environment 
Re-couplings, 
removal of the 
product 
Social 
level 
Employees, people 
who are usually 
unknown previous 
to recruitment, 
possibly not 
trustworthy 
Information security 
policies may 
possess faults 
Interviews, 
background 
checks (from 
available 
registers) 
Updating and 
tailoring 
security 
policies 
accordingly  
Double subjection 
(there is the 
relation to the self 
between the 
behavioral code 
and the self) 
Molding, 
education, 
further 
technical-level 
solutions 
Not a good 
user, that is, 
transfers 
uncertainty to 
technical level 
with careless 
use 
Technical-level 
solutions, 
continuous 
education 
Managerial 
solutions 
(punishment for bad 
behavior, warnings 
and dismissal if 
compliance 
refused) 
Physical 
level 
Uncertain structures 
of material or 
undesired elements 
come with it (e.g., 
dust) 
Quality 
checks, 
guards, 
reception 
desks 
Material wears 
out, locks rust 
Replacement, 
continuous 
checks, 
cleaning rooms 
Interrupts 
correct flows 
Removal, re-
coupling 
 
5. Discussion: Implications 
At this point, we understand the role of information security as an interrupter. In other words, the 
security machine comes between two entities such as a threat and a protected object that resides in 
an information system. Therefore, information security – the security machine – is always the third 
entity, the third agent that is included in the system in addition to the user agent and information. In 
practical terms, information security is always invited into the system from the outside as a third 
entity, whether it comes in the form of a firewall, information security standard or framework, 
information security policy, or an employee that carries out a security-related task as part of the 
security machine (Cf. Serres, 2007, pp.187–188). Thus, information security is a parallel addition to a 
system – even in cases in which security is integrated in the design of the system (cf. McManus, 
2009; Siponen, Baskerville, & Heikka, 2006). In brief, information security is part of the outside for 
which inclusion in the system is sought, while for some other chaotic parts – information security 
threats – exclusion is sought; an entity is included in order to gain the ability to exclude. For example, 
a virus scanner is invested in, brought in from the outside, in order to give the information system the 
ability to exclude malware. 
 
However, after the security machine is integrated into the system, it transforms the order of the 
system. In other words, a system with the addition has a more complicated order than one without it 
(Serres, 2007, p.188; see also Figures 1 and 2 in this paper). Now there are two orders: the order of 
the original system and the order created through the security machine. Nonetheless, these two 
different orders represent chaotic noise to each other as the need for reciprocal adaptation emerges: 
they are subjected to each other (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the entire apparatus – the constellation 
of systems, its users and information security machinery – has become something different: it has 
been transformed through the process of emergence described in Section 2.2. What is gained in such 
a situation from the system’s point of view is the improved chance to achieve CIA (an open system 
would be overrun by the outside chaos). However, the cost is increased complexity. 
 
As we demonstrate in Section 2, information security works through interruptions. However, only a 
small proportion of the interruptions are directed toward attacks from the outside. Instead, the object 
of the security machine’s activity is for the most part the inside. Here, it is important to note that the 
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security machine’s way of functioning is interruption. That is to say that information security primarily 
interrupts the inside when it comes between the user and their work in the form of awareness 
campaigns, password changes, locking computers, software security updates, information security 
education, regulations, locked doors, the use of keys, and so on (see Figure 3). However, we want to 
emphasize the fact that information security can also connect and mediate through interruption (for 
example, private email systems interrupt users by requiring a password, but this interruption is 
necessary for the existence of privacy). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Relationships between Information Security, IS, and User Agent, and the 
Direction of Practical and Research Problematization 
 
The direction of problematization represented in Figure 4 by line A is widely known: this represents 
the problems information security causes to the system; for example, the processing power that 
information security requires, or the effects updates have on the stability of the system. Line B 
represents the view by which the system itself is seen as a security problem. For example, different 
operating systems are considered to contain different security problems, so the design of the system 
might be a possible source of problems (e.g., McMagnus, 2009; Siponen et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
security standards, frameworks, and best practices consider information systems as problematic, and 
list dos and do nots for how to overcome and avoid these problems (e.g., ISO 27002, 2005). Line C 
represents the view of users and organization as problematic. The social side of information security 
approaches this problem by asking, for example, how to make users obedient to security norms and 
what the best way to educate them would be (e.g., Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011). The repeated 
argument that the human is the weakest link (e.g., see Long, Wiles, Mitnick, 2008; Mitnick & Simon, 
2002; Schneier, 2004; Stanton & Stam, 2006; Winkler, 2005) is included in Line C. Line D has not 
been at the center of information security research and has remained mainly unexamined. 
 
What, then, is there to study in terms of line D? Line D is the problematization of information security 
but not from the point of view of improvement. It represents questions such as “how is information 
security problematized by the users and organization?”. More generally, because information security 
is not a neutral entity but rather an interrupting and producing actor, we should study the effects of the 
security machine on the user agent and organization. Moreover, we should examine what is 
interrupted in various situations – what relations are broken by the activities performed by information 
security, the security machine. Other questions for investigation include how information security co-
exists with us (what requirements it places on us, for example, in terms of updating; what do we have 
to do – wait, install, restart the computer?), how it stays parallel to us (how it is always between the 
user and the machine; what effects this has on the user), how we are connected to it (how we are 
driven by the security machine to behave), what we are coupled to (all the information security 
measures we are subjected to), and what kind of machine we become. There is also the moral side to 
consider – for example, what kind of moral obligations come with the security machine? If a computer 
is infected by malware, where do we place the moral blame? We live with, in, and parallel to security 
machines. Our information is circulated through them. How do they change our territories, how are we 
subjected to them, and how do we become part of the subjecting machine? What do we become as 
part of it? What is the rhythm that comes with the coupling? For example, if an organization 
implements a standard, in what concrete situations does it actually place users on a regular basis? 
 
Line of relation 
Direction of 
problematization 
C 
D 
B 
A 
User agent (e.g., 
employee or 
organization) 
Information 
system (IS) 
Interruption by 
information security 
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For instance, what are the educational updating cycles? Can information security be so closely 
coupled with our life and have such an impact on us, on our organizations and territories, and yet 
be taken as a given so that it is almost invisible to us even though we live in and with it? The 
fundamental question is what else the security machine produces besides the order it seeks. In 
other words, what does it concretely mean to carry out security measures? As an addition to our 
life, what noise and chaos does it bring about? Briefly, we suggest that we should pay attention to 
the ramifications of being a part of and subjected to the security machine. In order to carry out this 
task, we have presented concepts relating to the security machine – interruption, coupling, 
subjection, emergence, territories (safe zones and data territories), inside/outside, order/chaos, 
walls and the spatial examination of information, CIA and IAA – to bring some conceptual order and 
provide a starting point. 
6. Conclusion 
We argue that information security is, ontologically, an order-preserving and producing socio-techno-
material machine that is a multiple, connective, territorial, subjecting, and transforming interrupter and 
producer. The security machine harnesses and subjects agents so that the combination created is 
able to carry out its task of interrupting chaos. Information security is an order-maintaining rhythm 
machine. Its main goals are to maintain the order of information written on a medium, and to maintain 
the order of surrounding territories – the safe zones. The constant becoming – the emerging 
connections and disconnections of the machine and its targets – makes the entire constellation 
transformative, which may send this precious order back to chaos. 
 
In the task of creating an order inside the system, information security interrupts the agents inside. 
However, the security machine is not a mere interrupter but a mediator. It makes the outside and 
chaos relevant to the order of information. Through passwords and user names, the security machine 
produces a relation between the system and its users. The security machine is all about the 
purification of the outside and the organization of the inside. The aim is for chaos to be left outside 
and the elements brought inside to be purified. However, there is always noise: while information can 
theoretically be pure at the level of order, it can never be pure when it is written on a medium 
because the noisy material medium becomes part of the information. An inside cannot be completely 
purified because it is built out of elements of the outside; the only difference between the elements 
lies in their order and organization. Information security is an order itself, but it is not without 
impurities. Chaos gets in. In fact, chaos is invited in by the security machine, which itself comes from 
the outside as an addition to the information system. As information security is an active entity, we 
propose that its effects on other agents inside the system should be studied. In this paper, we 
introduce concepts that could be used in such research. 
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